Gibt es eine englische Version des Friedenmanifests?

Sehr geehrte Frau S.,

vielen Dank für Ihre Nachricht und Ihren Zuspruch. Aktuell gibt es noch keine offizielle englische Version des Manifests, da es lediglich als Debattenbeitrag für den Bundesparteitag der SPD gedacht war. Auf Ihren Wunsch hin, habe ich jedoch ins Englische übersetzen lassen.

Mit freundlichen Grüßen

Ralf Stegner

Manifesto of the SPD Peace Circles

Safeguarding Peace in Europe through Defensive Capability, Arms Control and Understanding

Eighty years after the end of the catastrophe of the Second World War and the liberation from Hitler’s fascism, peace in Europe is once again under threat. We are witnessing new forms of violence and violations of human dignity: the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine, but also the grave violation of human rights in the Gaza Strip. Social divisions are deepening — both within and between societies. The man-made crisis of the Earth’s climate system, the destruction of food security, and new forms of colonialism in the race for raw materials are endangering peace and human security. Not least, nationalists are trying to exploit insecurity, conflicts and wars for their own shabby interests.

We are far from returning to a stable order of peace and security in Europe. On the contrary: in Germany and most other European countries, forces have prevailed that seek the future primarily in a strategy of military confrontation and in hundreds of billions of euros in armament spending. Peace and security, it is said, can no longer be achieved with Russia, but must be enforced against Russia. The call for ever more weapons and preparation for a supposedly looming war has replaced the aim of linking necessary defensive capability with arms control and disarmament — in order to achieve mutual security and reciprocal peaceability.

We are convinced that the concept of common security is the only responsible path to prevent war through confrontation and rearmament — across all ideological and geopolitical differences. This concept of common security also underpinned the agreement between US President Ronald Reagan and General Secretary of the CPSU Mikhail Gorbachev in 1987 to ban all nuclear intermediate-range missiles. That treaty was a key step towards ending the Cold War in Europe and made an essential contribution to German reunification.

Since the 1960s, the world has repeatedly stood on the brink of nuclear disaster. The Cold War was marked by deep mistrust and military confrontation between the powers of East and West. President John F. Kennedy, Chancellor Willy Brandt, and other political leaders of the time drew the right conclusions from the hopeless deadlock revealed during the Cuban Missile Crisis. Confrontation and rearmament gave way to dialogue and negotiations — focused on security through cooperation, confidence-building, arms control and disarmament.

The signing of the Helsinki Final Act of the CSCE in 1975 was a milestone in this combination of defense and disarmament policy. It ensured decades of peace in Europe and ultimately enabled German unification. In Helsinki, central principles of European security were agreed upon: equality of states regardless of size, the inviolability of territorial integrity, the renunciation of the threat or use of force, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, non-interference in the internal affairs of states, and comprehensive cooperation.

Today, we live in a different world. The European security order based on the principles of the Helsinki Final Act was already being eroded in the decades before Russia’s illegal war of aggression against Ukraine — also by the “West”: for example, through NATO’s military intervention in Serbia in 1999, the war in Iraq led by a “coalition of the willing” in 2003, or through the failure to comply with the nuclear disarmament obligations reaffirmed in 1995 under the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the withdrawal from and violations of major arms control agreements — mostly by the United States — and through the completely inadequate implementation of the Minsk Agreements after 2014.

This historical development shows: what is needed now is not unilateral blame but a differentiated analysis of all factors contributing to the departure from the principles of Helsinki. Precisely for that reason, we must not forget the lessons of history. A return to a policy of pure deterrence without arms control and with high levels of rearmament will not make Europe more secure. Instead, we must again pursue a peace policy aimed at common security.

To many, the idea of common security may seem illusory today. But that is a dangerous misconception, because there is no responsible alternative to such a policy. This path will not be easy. Before any real confidence-building measures can be taken, smaller steps are needed: curbing further escalation, protecting basic humanitarian standards, initiating technical cooperation — for example, in disaster relief or cyber security — and cautiously resuming diplomatic contacts. Only once such foundations have been laid can trust grow, making it possible to build a new European security architecture.

The public security policy discourse must also contribute to this process.

Europe must assume responsibility

Today, Europe is more than ever called upon to take responsibility into its own hands. Under President Trump, the United States once again pursued a strategy focused on confrontation, especially towards China. This increases the risk of further militarisation of international relations. Europe must counter this with an independent, peace-oriented security policy — and actively promote a return to a cooperative security order, based on the principles of the Helsinki Final Act of 1975.

At the same time, it is clear: a Bundeswehr capable of defending Germany, and a strengthening of Europe’s capacity to act in matters of security, are necessary. But this defensive capability must be embedded in a strategy of de-escalation and gradual confidence-building — not in a new arms race.

In fact, the European NATO member states, even without the armed forces of the United States, already have a significant conventional military advantage over Russia. Alarmist rhetoric and massive rearmament programmes do not bring more security to Germany and Europe — they lead instead to destabilisation and increased mutual threat perception between NATO and Russia.

Key elements of a future-oriented peace and security policy:

• As rapid as possible an end to the killing and dying in Ukraine. This requires intensified diplomatic efforts by all European states. Support for Ukraine’s legitimate legal claims must be linked to the legitimate security and stability interests of all in Europe. On this basis, an exceptionally difficult but necessary effort must be made to resume dialogue with Russia after the guns fall silent — to develop a peace and security order for Europe that is accepted and respected by all sides.
• Establishment of Europe’s own defensive capability, independent of the United States. Stopping the arms race. European security policy must not be guided by the logic of armament and war preparation, but by effective defense capabilities. We need armed forces equipped for defence — in a way that protects but does not create new risks.
• No justification exists for setting military spending at 3.5% or even 5% of GDP for years to come. It is irrational to base military spending on a fixed percentage of economic output. Instead of ever-increasing arms budgets, we urgently need more public investment to combat poverty, protect the climate and prevent the destruction of natural resources — which disproportionately affects people on low incomes in all countries.
• No deployment of new American intermediate-range missiles in Germany. The deployment of far-reaching, hypersonic US missile systems on German soil would turn our country into a primary target in the event of conflict.
• At the 2026 NPT Review Conference, the obligation to nuclear disarmament under Article VI must be renewed — and reinforced through binding progress reports and legally grounded “No First Use” declarations.
• At the same time, efforts must be made to renew the New START Treaty, which expires in 2026, and to initiate new negotiations on arms limitation, arms control, confidence-building and diplomacy in Europe.
• A gradual return to détente and cooperation with Russia, and stronger consideration for the needs of the Global South — particularly in responding to the common threat posed by climate change.
• No involvement of Germany or the EU in any military escalation in the Asia-Pacific region.

About the SPD Peace Circles

The SPD Peace Circles are an advisory group that meets regularly to discuss questions of peace policy within the SPD. Participants come from a broad range of initiatives, associations and working groups — including the Erhard-Eppler-Kreis, Willy-Brandt-Kreis, the Johannes-Rau-Gesellschaft, SPD 60 plus, “Mehr Diplomatie wagen”, Demokratische Linke 21, Entspannungspolitik Jetzt!, Naturfreunde, and the Peace Working Groups in Bremen and Cologne.